黑格爾劄記

姑且寫點「扮讀過書」的筆記。
 
其實我對黑格爾的哲學基本上一無所知。困惑純粹是因為讀到他那句被引用甚廣的格言：「存在即合理」。像很多人也提過，這種「局部」譯法很易引起誤會。這話的德語原文是：「Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich, und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.」，英譯為：「What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational」，而一般中文翻譯則是：「凡是合乎理性的東西都是現實的，凡是現實的東西都是合乎理性的。」
 
一般誤會，在於將「合理」解讀為「公平合理」義（fair and just）。而一件事情「合乎理性」（或說，是理性可解釋的）（rational）並不必然意味它是「道德合理、正當」（morally reasonable/acceptable）的，此理不難明白。
 
是故以我粗淺理解，前句的「合乎理性」，其實是暗含一潛台詞在內的：即理性所先要「關懷」和「處理」的，必然是現實中的東西；而後句意思，則是現實中的一切，其實也是「理性」可解釋的。故若不嫌引申，此句或可大膽改寫為：凡理由必牽涉存在，凡存在必具有理由。
 
但大陸學者鄧安慶卻在其翻譯的註腳中提出了一個更徹底的看法（他的版本是「凡是有理性的，都是現實的；凡是現實的，都是有理性的。」）：黑格爾這裡所用的「理性」（vernünftig）並不等同後來西方常見的概念「合理」（rational）。他說「Vernunft」的字根源自古希臘語「logos」；而「合理性」 ( Rationalität） 或「合理的」( rational）的字根卻是希臘文拉丁化後才出現的。希臘的「理性」作為宇宙的邏各斯，是自然秉有的。用黑格爾的話說，是自在自為的。而拉丁化後的「合理性」則附加了「算計」的含義在內，是評價的、反思的、主觀的（即人性化了？）。於是這就變成了兩個意思不同的詞語。黑格爾的理性主義是希臘的，而不是現代的。所以，黑格爾這裡的用語「vernünftig」，我們只能翻譯為「有理性的」而不能譯作「合理的」 ( rational) ……這是「自在自為有理性」的東西，而不必然是（世俗觀念或認知裏的）「合理性」或「合乎理性」的東西。
 
這麼說來，所謂「理性」便變得好像是老子的「道」一樣的東西了（i.e. 道法自然）。固然，我也曾聽聞「Geist」是黑格爾的核心思想，故也不否認那格言中的「理性」是可以包含「自然的理性」這一含義的。但問題是，在肯定「自然的理性」存在之餘，有必要這樣徹底分割、拒斥、摒除一切自啟蒙時期以來的、以人為本位的「理性」的涵義嗎？「自然的理性」和「人的理性」在黑格爾的思想中，真的是如此不相容的東西嗎？鄧氏斷言「黑格爾的理性主義是希臘而不是現代的」，那又如何解釋以下黑格爾「since philosophy is exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the comprehension of the present and the actual, not the setting up of a world beyond which exists God knows where」（Philosophy of Right, trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.20）這番話中所強調的「當下」（present）？這些都是我想向有哲學根底的朋友求證、求教的地方。（21/1/2022）
 
‧

慢慢讀黑格爾《法哲學原理》的序言。觀點或不盡同意，但文風暫時挺對胃口。其文筆在耐性中見辛辣，如以下這段：
 
「The particular form of bad conscience which betrays itself in the vainglorious eloquence of this superficial philosophy may be remarked on here; for in the first place, it is precisely where it is at its most spiritless that it has most to say about spirit, where its talk is driest and most lifeless that it is freest with the words 'life' and 'enliven', and where it shows the utmost selfishness of empty arrogance that it most often refers to the 'people'.」(trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.16)
 
這番話，若將「superficial philosophy」一詞改換成「寫作」（或「言說」），其實亦同樣適用。（22/1/2022）
 
‧
 
大致看完《法哲學原理》的序言，也算是粗略印證了一些最初的「想當然」式的估計：黑格爾的理性（或「精神」/Geist）實乃一種「浪漫化」（romanticized）了的「道」（畢竟其學說也是生成於浪漫主義的高峰時代）。（24/1/2022）
 
「It is a great obstinacy, the kind of obstinacy which does honour to human beings, that they are unwilling to acknowledge in their attitudes [Gesimlzmg] anything which has not been justified by thought - and this obstinacy is the characteristic property of the modem age, as well as being the distinctive principle of Protestantism.」(trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.22)
 
「Reason is not content with an approximation which, as something 'neither cold nor hot', it 'spews out of its mouth'; and it is as little content with that cold despair which confesses that, in this temporal world, things are bad or at best indifferent, but that nothing better can be expected here, so that for this reason alone we should live at peace with actuality. The peace which cognition establishes with the actual world has more warmth in it than this (Another version translated by T. M. Knox: “It is a warmer peace with the world which knowledge supplies.”).」(Ibid., p.23)
 
「When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.」(Ibid.)
 
‧
 
讀羅素的《西方哲學史》，見其對黑格爾甚多疵議，尤其是在對待戰爭的立場上。我想雙方態度興許也是可理解的：畢竟前者是寫作於二戰剛剛結束的時候，而後者乃是置身於歐洲協調（The Concert of Europe）的期間。（20/3/2022）
 
「War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external accident, which itself therefore has some accidental cause, be it injustices, the passions of nations or the holders of power, &c., or in short, something or other which ought not to be (H. B. Nisbet’s version: For war should not be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external contingency whose cause [Grund] is therefore itself contingent, whether this cause lies in the passions of rulers or nations, in injustices etc., or in anything else which is not as it should be)... War is the state of affairs which deals in earnest with the vanity(vain) of temporal goods and concerns (T. M. Knox’s version: War is the state of affairs in which the vanity of temporal goods and concerns is treated with all seriousness) - a vanity at other times a common theme of edifying sermonising (H. B. Nisbet’s version: which tends at other times to be merely a pious phrase). This is what makes it the moment in which the ideality of the particular attains its right and is actualised. War has the higher significance that by its agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, 'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in(means during, while; not because, owe to) their indifference to the stabilisation of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone “perpetual”, peace.'」(Philosophy of Right, trans by S. W. Dyde) From (https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate2.htm)

‧
 
黑格爾對「神」的觀念與界定。其實有點像儒家的「天視自我民視」，只是他更強調當中那種「逆反」的過程或動態而已。而黑格爾哲學的一個特點就是：寫的雖是擺明車馬的「大部頭」哲學著作，但用的很多時候卻是不折不扣的文學語言（據說他本身年少時也甚有文學天分，只是不幸被哲學所「耽誤」而已，一笑）：
 
「The world spirit is the spirit of the world as it reveals itself through the human consciousness; the relationship of men to it is that of single parts to the whole which is their substance. And this world spirit corresponds to the divine spirit, which is the absolute spirit. Since God is omnipresent, he is present in everyone and appears in everyone's consciousness; and this is the world spirit.」 (Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p.52-53, trans. by H. B. Nisbet)
 
「It lies essentially in the notion of religion... that it be revealed, and, what is more, revealed by God... the modern assertions that man cannot ascertain God... are the more illogical, because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed;... if the word Mind(Geist) is to have a meaning, it implies the revelation of Him(God)... nothing serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. To know what God as spirit is—to apprehend this accurately and distinctly in thoughts— requires careful and thorough speculation (i.e. philosophy). It includes, in its fore-front, the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is, further, his selfconsciousness in man, and man's knowledge of God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God.」(Philosophy of Mind, trans. by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, p.363-364)
 
重點在尾句。Kaufmann的譯法更為直白：
 
「God is only God insofar as he knows himself; his knowing himself is, furthermore, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God that goes on to man's knowing himself in God」 (Quoted from Kaufmann, Walter, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.272-273)
 
不得不說，這實在是極其大膽的論述，不再只是停留「天視自我民視」（即天是透過人眼來觀察世界），且更是人能昇華、存身於「天視」之內，且直接以之視物了（這不正是俗語所謂「開天眼」嗎？）。而就黑格爾對宗教的看法，Kaufmann有以下精要的簡括：
 
「In its relation to philosophy, however, religion, including even Christianity, is as a child compared to a man: it is an anticipation in less developed form of what finds mature expression in philosophy.」 (Kaufmann, Walter, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.271)
 
宗教之於哲學，即如一童騃的心靈在面對大人時，每刻亦期待、盼待着成熟。說得何其積極、平和，而樂觀。藉此亦或可略窺其所處時代之一斑。
 
（5月, 2022稿。2月, 2026修訂）
 
‧

《精神現象學》（The Phenomenology of Spirit）的序言只讀了十多頁便舉手投降了（Miller譯本共45頁）。起初也以為是自己無哲學底，理解力太不濟，誰知不久便在Kaufmann書裏讀到這段話：
 
「it is not saying too much when I claim that anyone understands Hegel’s philosophy if he completely masters the meaning of this preface.」(By Rudolf Haym, quoted from Walter Kaufmann’s Hegel: Texts and Commentary)
 
連畢生專研、皓首其中的學者也這樣說，那對於僅是「涉獵」者如我，得其四、五分之一，亦大沒理由不暗自感到心足了。就着黑格爾的哲學何以晦澀，Kaufmann目光透徹，其言可謂一語中的：
 
「never before had any major philosopher so patently enjoyed allusions, and so lavishly indulged in this pleasure... The highly allusive style turns the reader into a detective rather than a critical philosopher」(Kaufmann’s Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.120)
 
「Thus allusions replace arguments.」 (Ibid, p.120)
 
「What, then, accounts for this peculiarity of style of the Phenomenology?... At bottom, it is the same impulse that lulls the critical intelligence to sleep in some of Plato's dialogues and in some of Nietzsche's writings, although both meant above all else to get us to think critically: the poetic impulse.」 (Ibid, p.121)
 
末節說得最富意味：在闡發智性同時，亦往往有意讓其眠息，在某種「詩情」的底藴下。Kaufmann說，在此之前，從未有哪位哲學家的行文會如此沉溺於影射（allusions）……我不諳德文，但若以讀英譯的感覺來推斷，其文風毋乃是不斷繁衍增生的指代，層層包覆，儘管最終都或是隱隱然指向他那庶幾耳熟能詳的思想核心：「Geist」，而肯定他的思想家（如柯靈烏Collingwood）則多會暗嘉之為一種「向外張展」的旋風（“History... never repeats itself; its movements travel not in circles but in spirals, and apparent repetitions are always differentiated by having acquired something new”, The Idea of History, p.114-115），但若平情而論，這種如此執拗地鋪張文辭、泛濫影射，處處和讀者「過不去」，卻又處處在語態的螺旋裏滲露出一種同義深化或同義反複之意味（或嫌疑）的文風，讀久了，也真難免會有嚼蠟之嘆。Kaufmann顯然也曉得這點，而難得是他能從讀者角度出發，如接下來這番話，簡直是直接說到人的心坎上：
 
“But the whole style of the Phenomenology is such that the student and scholar are almost bound to ask themselves: What is the man talking about? Whom does he have in mind? Indeed—and this is crucial—the obscurity and whole manner of the text are such that these questions are almost bound to replace the question of whether what Hegel says is right（一笑）. Until one knows about whom he is writing, one is often at a loss to say whether he is right; and at other times what he says is so plainly not right and his generalizations are so fantastic that the only way to understand how anybody could even think of saying such things is to refer his statements back to the individual of whom he was thinking.” (Kaufmann’s Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.124-125)
 
讀罷真是由衷擊節。不是其「說得對否」，而是「為甚麼竟可以這樣說」，這已是幾近乎中國「知人論世」的傳統了。就《精神現象學》的那篇「名序」，Kaufmann還特意寫了本《Hegel: Texts and Commentary》去注釋它（頗有中國傳統注疏感覺）。故在每當讀到茫淼無從、懷疑人生之時，還是很感謝有像Kaufmann這種富於人情而同理的解人；所言者縱未必足成津梁，但渺渺文海，至少聊有一葦着目，也是好的。（4/3/2026）
 
‧
 
又：尼采對黑格爾「臃腫」文風的解釋，可謂一針見血：
 
"Esprit and Morality.—The Germans, who have mastered the secret of being boring with spirit, knowledge, and feeling, and who have accustomed themselves to experience boredom as something moral, are afraid of French esprit because it might prick out the eyes of morality—and yet this dread is fused with temptation... Perhaps none of the famous Germans had more esprit than Hegel; but he also felt such a great German dread of it that this created his peculiar bad style. For the essence of this style is that a core is enveloped, and enveloped once more and again, until it scarcely peeks out, bashful and curious... But this core is a witty, often saucy idea about the most intellectual matters, a subtle and daring connection of words,... but in these wrappings it presents itself as abstruse science itself and by all means as supremely moral boredom. Thus the Germans had a form of esprit permitted to them, and they enjoyed it with such extravagant delight..." (By Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted from Kaufmann’s Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.99)
 
‧