黑格爾劄記

姑且寫點「扮讀過書」的筆記。
 
其實我對黑格爾的哲學基本上一無所知。困惑純粹是因為讀到他那句被引用甚廣的格言：「存在即合理」。像很多人也提過，這種「局部」譯法很易引起誤會。這話的德語原文是：「Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich, und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.」，英譯為：「What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational」，而一般中文翻譯則是：「凡是合乎理性的東西都是現實的，凡是現實的東西都是合乎理性的。」
 
一般誤會，在於將「合理」解讀為「公平合理」義（fair and just）。而一件事情「合乎理性」（或說，是理性可解釋的）（rational）並不必然意味它是「道德合理、正當」（morally reasonable/acceptable）的，此理不難明白。
 
是故以我粗淺理解，前句的「合乎理性」，其實是暗含一潛台詞在內的：即理性所先要「關懷」和「處理」的，必然是現實中的東西；而後句意思，則是現實中的一切，其實也是「理性」可解釋的。故若不嫌引申，此句或可大膽改寫為：凡理由必牽涉存在，凡存在必具有理由。
 
但大陸學者鄧安慶卻在其翻譯的註腳中提出了一個更徹底的看法（他的版本是「凡是有理性的，都是現實的；凡是現實的，都是有理性的。」）：黑格爾這裡所用的「理性」（vernünftig）並不等同後來西方常見的概念「合理」（rational）。他說「Vernunft」的字根源自古希臘語「logos」；而「合理性」 ( Rationalität） 或「合理的」( rational）的字根卻是希臘文拉丁化後才出現的。希臘的「理性」作為宇宙的邏各斯，是自然秉有的。用黑格爾的話說，是自在自為的。而拉丁化後的「合理性」則附加了「算計」的含義在內，是評價的、反思的、主觀的（即人性化了？）。於是這就變成了兩個意思不同的詞語。黑格爾的理性主義是希臘的，而不是現代的。所以，黑格爾這裡的用語「vernünftig」，我們只能翻譯為「有理性的」而不能譯作「合理的」 ( rational) ……這是「自在自為有理性」的東西，而不必然是（世俗觀念或認知裏的）「合理性」或「合乎理性」的東西。
 
這麼說來，所謂「理性」便變得好像是老子的「道」一樣的東西了（i.e. 道法自然）。固然，我也曾聽聞「Geist」是黑格爾的核心思想，故也不否認那格言中的「理性」是可以包含「自然的理性」這一含義的。但問題是，在肯定「自然的理性」存在之餘，有必要這樣徹底分割、拒斥、摒除一切自啟蒙時期以來的、以人為本位的「理性」的涵義嗎？「自然的理性」和「人的理性」在黑格爾的思想中，真的是如此不相容的東西嗎？鄧氏斷言「黑格爾的理性主義是希臘而不是現代的」，那又如何解釋以下黑格爾「since philosophy is exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the comprehension of the present and the actual, not the setting up of a world beyond which exists God knows where」（Philosophy of Right, trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.20）這番話中所強調的「當下」（present）？這些都是我想向有哲學根底的朋友求證、求教的地方。（21/1/2022）
 
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慢慢讀黑格爾《法哲學原理》的序言。觀點或不盡同意，但文風暫時挺對胃口。其文筆在耐性中見辛辣，如以下這段：
 
「The particular form of bad conscience which betrays itself in the vainglorious eloquence of this superficial philosophy may be remarked on here; for in the first place, it is precisely where it is at its most spiritless that it has most to say about spirit, where its talk is driest and most lifeless that it is freest with the words 'life' and 'enliven', and where it shows the utmost selfishness of empty arrogance that it most often refers to the 'people'.」(trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.16)
 
這番話，若將「superficial philosophy」一詞改換成「寫作」（或「言說」），其實亦同樣適用。（22/1/2022）
 
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大致看完《法哲學原理》的序言，也算是粗略印證了一些最初的「想當然」式的估計：黑格爾的理性（或「精神」/Geist）實乃一種「浪漫化」（romanticized）了的「道」（畢竟其學說也是生成於浪漫主義的高峰時代）。（24/1/2022）
 
「It is a great obstinacy, the kind of obstinacy which does honour to human beings, that they are unwilling to acknowledge in their attitudes [Gesimlzmg] anything which has not been justified by thought - and this obstinacy is the characteristic property of the modem age, as well as being the distinctive principle of Protestantism.」(trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.22)
 
「Reason is not content with an approximation which, as something 'neither cold nor hot', it 'spews out of its mouth'; and it is as little content with that cold despair which confesses that, in this temporal world, things are bad or at best indifferent, but that nothing better can be expected here, so that for this reason alone we should live at peace with actuality. The peace which cognition establishes with the actual world has more warmth in it than this (Another version translated by T. M. Knox: “It is a warmer peace with the world which knowledge supplies.”).」(Ibid., p.23)
 
「When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.」(Ibid.)
 
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讀羅素的《西方哲學史》，見其對黑格爾甚多疵議，尤其是在對待戰爭的立場上。我想雙方態度興許也是可理解的：畢竟前者是寫作於二戰剛剛結束的時候，而後者乃是置身於歐洲協調（The Concert of Europe）的期間。（20/3/2022）
 
「War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external accident, which itself therefore has some accidental cause, be it injustices, the passions of nations or the holders of power, &c., or in short, something or other which ought not to be (H. B. Nisbet’s version: For war should not be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external contingency whose cause [Grund] is therefore itself contingent, whether this cause lies in the passions of rulers or nations, in injustices etc., or in anything else which is not as it should be)... War is the state of affairs which deals in earnest with the vanity(vain) of temporal goods and concerns (T. M. Knox’s version: War is the state of affairs in which the vanity of temporal goods and concerns is treated with all seriousness) - a vanity at other times a common theme of edifying sermonising (H. B. Nisbet’s version: which tends at other times to be merely a pious phrase). This is what makes it the moment in which the ideality of the particular attains its right and is actualised. War has the higher significance that by its agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, 'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilisation of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone “perpetual”, peace.'」(Philosophy of Right, trans by S. W. Dyde) From (https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate2.htm)

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黑格爾對「神」的觀念與界定。其實有點像儒家的「天視自我民視」，只是他更強調當中那種「逆反」的過程或動態而已。而黑格爾哲學的一個特點就是：寫的雖是擺明車馬的「大部頭」哲學著作，但用的很多時候卻是不折不扣的文學語言（據說他本身年少時也甚有文學天分，只是不幸被哲學所「耽誤」而已，一笑）：
 
「The world spirit is the spirit of the world as it reveals itself through the human consciousness; the relationship of men to it is that of single parts to the whole which is their substance. And this world spirit corresponds to the divine spirit, which is the absolute spirit. Since God is omnipresent, he is present in everyone and appears in everyone's consciousness; and this is the world spirit.」 (Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p.52-53, trans. by H. B. Nisbet)
 
「It lies essentially in the notion of religion... that it be revealed, and, what is more, revealed by God... the modern assertions that man cannot ascertain God... are the more illogical, because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed;... if the word Mind(Geist) is to have a meaning, it implies the revelation of Him(God)... nothing serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. To know what God as spirit is—to apprehend this accurately and distinctly in thoughts— requires careful and thorough speculation (i.e. philosophy). It includes, in its fore-front, the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is, further, his selfconsciousness in man, and man's knowledge of God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God.」(Philosophy of Mind, trans. by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, p.363-364)
 
重點在尾句。Kaufmann的譯法更為直白：
 
「God is only God insofar as he knows himself; his knowing himself is, furthermore, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God that goes on to man's knowing himself in God」 (Quoted from Kaufmann, Walter, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.272-273)
 
不得不說，這實在是極其大膽的論述，不再只是停留「天視自我民視」（即天是透過人眼來觀察世界），且更是人能昇華、存身於「天視」之內，且直接以之視物了（這不正是俗語所謂「開天眼」嗎？）。而就黑格爾對宗教的看法，Kaufmann有以下精要的簡括：
 
「In its relation to philosophy, however, religion, including even Christianity, is as a child compared to a man: it is an anticipation in less developed form of what finds mature expression in philosophy.」 (Kaufmann, Walter, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.271)
 
宗教之於哲學，即如一童騃的心靈在面對大人時，每刻亦期待、盼待着成熟。說得何其積極、平和，而樂觀。藉此亦或可略窺其所處時代之一斑。
 
（5月, 2022稿。2月, 2026修訂）
 
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《精神現象學》（The Phenomenology of Spirit）的序言只讀了十多頁便舉手投降了（Miller譯本共45頁）。起初也以為是自己無哲學底，理解力太不濟，誰知不久便在Kaufmann書裏讀到這段話：
 
「it is not saying too much when I claim that anyone understands Hegel’s philosophy if he completely masters the meaning of this preface.」(By Rudolf Haym, quoted from Walter Kaufmann’s Hegel: Texts and Commentary)
 
連畢生專研、皓首其中的學者也這樣說，那對於僅是「涉獵」者如我，得其四、五分之一，亦大沒理由不暗自感到心足了。就着黑格爾的哲學何以晦澀，Kaufmann目光透徹，其言可謂一語中的：
 
「never before had any major philosopher so patently enjoyed allusions, and so lavishly indulged in this pleasure... The highly allusive style turns the reader into a detective rather than a critical philosopher」(Kaufmann’s Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.120)
 
「Thus allusions replace arguments.」 (Ibid, p.120)
 
「What, then, accounts for this peculiarity of style of the Phenomenology?... At bottom, it is the same impulse that lulls the critical intelligence to sleep in some of Plato's dialogues and in some of Nietzsche's writings, although both meant above all else to get us to think critically: the poetic impulse.」 (Ibid, p.121)
 
末節說得最富意味：在闡發智性同時，亦往往有意讓其眠息，在某種「詩情」的底藴下。Kaufmann說，在此之前，從未有哪位哲學家的行文會如此沉溺於影射（allusions）……我不諳德文，但若以讀英譯的感覺來推斷，其文風毋乃是不斷繁衍增生的指代，層層包覆，儘管最終都或是隱隱然指向他那庶幾耳熟能詳的思想核心：「Geist」，而肯定他的思想家（如柯靈烏Collingwood）則多會暗嘉之為一種「向外張展」的旋風（“History... never repeats itself; its movements travel not in circles but in spirals, and apparent repetitions are always differentiated by having acquired something new”, The Idea of History, p.114-115），但若平情而論，這種如此執拗地鋪張文辭、泛濫影射，處處和讀者「過不去」，卻又處處在語態的螺旋裏滲露出一種同義深化或同義反複之意味（或嫌疑）的文風，讀久了，也真難免會有嚼蠟之嘆。Kaufmann顯然也曉得這點，而難得是他能從讀者角度出發，如接下來這番話，簡直是直接說到人的心坎上：
 
“But the whole style of the Phenomenology is such that the student and scholar are almost bound to ask themselves: What is the man talking about? Whom does he have in mind? Indeed—and this is crucial—the obscurity and whole manner of the text are such that these questions are almost bound to replace the question of whether what Hegel says is right（一笑）. Until one knows about whom he is writing, one is often at a loss to say whether he is right; and at other times what he says is so plainly not right and his generalizations are so fantastic that the only way to understand how anybody could even think of saying such things is to refer his statements back to the individual of whom he was thinking.” (Kaufmann’s Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.124-125)
 
讀罷真是由衷擊節。不是其「說得對否」，而是「為甚麼竟可以這樣說」，這已是幾近乎中國「知人論世」的傳統了。就《精神現象學》的那篇「名序」，Kaufmann還特意寫了本《Hegel: Texts and Commentary》去注釋它（頗有中國傳統注疏感覺）。故在每當讀到茫淼無從、懷疑人生之時，還是很感謝有像Kaufmann這種富於人情而同理的解人；所言者縱未必足成津梁，但渺渺文海，至少聊有一葦着目，也是好的。（4/3/2026）
 
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又：尼采對黑格爾「臃腫」文風的解釋，可謂一針見血：
 
"Esprit and Morality.—The Germans, who have mastered the secret of being boring with spirit, knowledge, and feeling, and who have accustomed themselves to experience boredom as something moral, are afraid of French esprit because it might prick out the eyes of morality—and yet this dread is fused with temptation... Perhaps none of the famous Germans had more esprit than Hegel; but he also felt such a great German dread of it that this created his peculiar bad style. For the essence of this style is that a core is enveloped, and enveloped once more and again, until it scarcely peeks out, bashful and curious... But this core is a witty, often saucy idea about the most intellectual matters, a subtle and daring connection of words,... but in these wrappings it presents itself as abstruse science itself and by all means as supremely moral boredom. Thus the Germans had a form of esprit permitted to them, and they enjoyed it with such extravagant delight..." (By Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted from Kaufmann’s Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p.99)
 
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就黑格爾哲學之浩繁汗漫，若說其意涵，只能選一段文字來該括的話，我大概會揀以下《精神現象學》裏的這節（即在其書序開首）：
 
「The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant(i.e. supersede) one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. But he who rejects a philosophical system [i.e. the new philosopher] does not usually comprehend what he is doing in this way; and he who grasps the contradiction between them [i.e. the historian of philosophy] does not, as a general rule, know how to free it from its one-sidedness, or maintain it in its freedom by recognizing the reciprocally necessary moments that take shape as a conflict and seeming incompatibility」 (The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, p.2)
 
「花」的譬喻，以及使「系統」維持動態之必要（乃至承認「衝突」乃是使生命保有自由的惟一手段），信是黑格爾整個哲學的核心精華所在。讀過這節後，其實彼整個學說已粗見輪廓，而對於我這類僅是「打水漂」的讀者來說，為了人的精神着想，似乎亦大可掩卷了（一笑）。只是以上「況喻」已說得如此圓足，也難免令人好奇會如何發揮下去，畢竟「大原則/原理」既已闡明，接下來便是要注入一種「文氣、動力」，以成就其「動態」──故在接後便祭出了「Becoming」一語，來作為統攝、主宰該「整體性」的要點：
 
「For the subject matter is not exhausted by any aim, but only by the way in which things are worked out in detail; nor is the result the actual whole, but only the result together with its becoming. The aim, taken by itself, is a lifeless generality; the tendency is a mere drift which still lacks actuality; and the naked result is the corpse which has left the tendency behind.」 (trans. by Walter Kaufmann, from his Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p.17)
 
「The true is the whole. But the whole is only the essence perfecting itself through its development.」  (Ibid, p.26)
 
所謂「Becoming」，即真理（或精神）總是在行進、發展過程裏不斷自我完善。但既然自亙古以還，「精神」（Geist）俱已是如此周流了，那作為哲學，現在才特意將之提出來，又有甚麼意義？
 
「To demonstrate that it is now time for philosophy to be elevated into science would therefore be the only true justification of any attempt that has this as its aim, because it would demonstrate the necessity of that aim, and, at the same time, it would be the realization of the aim itself.」 (The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by Pinkard, Terry, p.6)
 
這是較易受忽略的一點──要證明當下就是實踐其哲學的最佳（或最適切的）時機。時代已降臨，故時刻亦如是，牽涉的，其實是一種對時間「終始」的精確感知或把握（亦即其得以在此侃侃而談的一切所在、所據）──這可比證明甚麼「過程和結果乃一整體，缺一不可」、或「結果不能取替過程」之類的老調（說來竟有點似中學生作文意味了，一笑）要艱難得多了。而要揭示出「時機」，少不免要回到歷史，或至少說，是一種自啟蒙以來的「大體」歷史敍述或感知裏；由是潛默委心，才能類推、感應出那一份或共時、或歷時的，在時代、人心上的普遍的渴求：
 
「The eye of the Spirit had to be forcibly turned and held fast to the things of this world; and it has taken a long time before the lucidity which only heavenly things used to have could penetrate the dullness and confusion in which the sense of worldly things was enveloped, and so make attention to the here and now as such, attention to what has been called 'experience', an interesting and valid enterprise. Now we seem to need just the opposite: sense is so fast rooted in earthly things that it requires just as much force to raise it. The Spirit shows itself as so impoverished that, like a wanderer in the desert craving for a mere mouthful of water, it seems to crave for its refreshment only the bare feeling of the divine in general. By the little which now satisfies Spirit, we can measure the extent of its loss.」 (The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, p.5)
 
說的大概是啟蒙以後（即自經驗論或觀念論以降），人對現世經驗的日益側重，與既往古希臘理型世界的那種崇高、抽象對比，此中自有一種歷史的失落感和唏噓在內。限於學力，我自己對這種「哲學史」式的感慨，雖也或覺隱然可懷，但到底體會有限；不過就「sense is so fast rooted in earthly things」，及「the divine in general」（指的其實也即是一種抽象的「wholeness/完整性」了）兩點，我倒是想起另外兩段從別的「文學」書裏讀過的段落；首先是毛姆（Maugham）在《The Summing Up》（1938）裏的話：
 
「I do not suppose men in past centuries were any different from the men we know, but they must surely have appeared to their contemporaries more of a piece than they do to us now, or writers would not have thus represented them.」
 
黑格爾口中總是語帶嚮往的「wholeness」，百年後在毛姆筆下則頓時成了「more of a piece」的挖苦──時代推遷之劇鉅，人世觀感、認知之動輒解離、變滅，乃至依漸回入風息，黯落、委地如涓埃，由此亦可想、可感識一二。至若「意識已然深植於現世」（fast rooted in earthly things），即所謂啟蒙後的「現世感」方面，我讀哲學書不多，想到的，卻是芸芸現代散文、小說裏的那種「臨場感」，如Joyce Carol Oates所云：
 
"This is the art of the contemporary essay, or memoir: a heightened, trompe l'oeil attention to detail that allows the reader to see, hear, witness, as if at first hand, what the essayist has witnessed." (Joyce Carol Oates ed., The Best American Essays of the Century, p.xxii, 2000)
 
具體而微、恰如「彷真畫般」（trompe l'oeil）呈現的技術技藝，讓讀者幾以為透過文字，即可以第一身重歷作者的直接生命體驗──這無疑只是一種錯覺。而相對於「現代」（或「現世」）以降後可期的眾聲喧譁，若人稍稍回想自己閱讀當代文學時的經驗，感受到的，恐也未必是聲息之開顯雜沓，而可能只是其屏退──如觀影，本身、本質上已必然是種受限視覺，故檢視經驗（make attention to... 'experience'），隨之而來的亦不免是經驗的受限，為世感知，最終是擴闊還是收窄，其實誰也說不準──換言之，黑格爾說，人的意識在啟蒙後已是大致透穿了現世塵霧的此一假定（the lucidity... could penetrate the dullness and confusion in which the sense of worldly things was enveloped, and so make attention to... 'experience', an interesting and valid enterprise），故未必盡然（觀乎前述的「受限」），而所謂的「現世事物」（fast rooted in earthly things），到頭來亦可能只是一種「彷真」而已──但這又有甚麼關係呢，誠如毛姆也說過：「The professional writer creates the mood」，「mood」寫到位了，興許讀者在百年後還是會感受到箇中誠懇的（一笑）。而在法國大革命後，世界也似乎正委實需要一套論述，來支撐、承載人心對於新時勢的想像，故才有了以下這段彷如「陽光競四溟」般的、宣言式的句子：
 
“Besides, it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era... Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth - there is a qualitative leap, and the child is born... The frivolity and boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world.” (The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, p.6-7)
 
時代與說法，信納與否，或容有後見之明可憑，但更多時候，它僅在乎一個人的微薄經驗和想像──而想像得仰藉文字，畢竟着目之際，但見前代者的文字，淅淅如光點，已然先拔頭籌，正靜待着人的對號入座。（4/4/2026）

試譯：〈一陣昏沉將我的神志封閉〉華茲渥斯【A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal－William Wordsworth】 淺白

 〈一陣昏沉將我的神志封閉〉　威廉·華茲渥斯（試譯：淺白）
 
一陣昏沉將我的神志封閉；
我沒有人世的畏懼：
像一無感的死物，她已不能
知覺世上年月的觸撫。
 

現在她已沒有動靜、動力；

她既不聞也不見──

每天隨地球的運行滾轉，

和着巨巖、細石，以及群樹

 
29/8/2022初稿
 
“A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal”
By William Wordsworth
 
A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.
 
No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees.
 
1799

圖片源自網絡。

另附楊牧譯本：

 〈昏睡〉

一陣昏睡將我神志封閉；

　再也沒有生與死的恐懼：

她無感不覺，宛然物化

　人間歲月未曾留下痕跡。

 

靜止不動，略無氣息；

　聽聞皆渺茫，視不見其餘；

惟運行健同大地日夜之有序，

　如岩，如石，如樹兀立。

試譯：〈感念無名師長〉 葉慈【Gratitude to the Unknown Instructors－William Butler Yeats】

感念無名師長　　葉慈（試譯：淺白）
 
凡乃他們最初立心做的
他們均已使之發生；
所有事儘如一滴風露
凝掛在每株綠草的刃面。
 
16/8/2022稿
 
Gratitude to the Unknown Instructors
By William Butler Yeats (From his 1933 collection The Winding Stair)
 
What they undertook to do
They brought to pass;
All things hang like a drop of dew
Upon a blade of grass. 

圖片源自網絡。