慢慢讀黑格爾《法哲學原理》的序言。觀點或不盡同意，但文風暫時挺對胃口。其文筆在耐性中見辛辣，如以下這段：
「The particular form of bad conscience which betrays itself in the vainglorious eloquence of this superficial philosophy may be remarked on here; for in the first place, it is precisely where it is at its most spiritless that it has most to say about spirit, where its talk is driest and most lifeless that it is freest with the words 'life' and 'enliven', and where it shows the utmost selfishness of empty arrogance that it most often refers to the 'people'.」(trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.16)
這番話，若將「superficial philosophy」一詞改換成「寫作」（或「言說」），其實亦同樣適用。（22/1/2022）
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大致看完《法哲學原理》的序言，也算是粗略印證了一些最初的「想當然」式的估計：黑格爾的理性（或Geist）實乃一種「浪漫化」（romanticized）了的「道」（畢竟其學說也是生成於浪漫主義的高峰時代）。（24/1/2022）
「It is a great obstinacy, the kind of obstinacy which does honour to human beings, that they are unwilling to acknowledge in their attitudes [Gesimlzmg] anything which has not been justified by thought - and this obstinacy is the characteristic property of the modem age, as well as being the distinctive principle of Protestantism.」(trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.22)
「Reason is not content with an approximation which, as something 'neither cold nor hot', it 'spews out of its mouth'; and it is as little content with that cold despair which confesses that, in this temporal world, things are bad or at best indifferent, but that nothing better can be expected here, so that for this reason alone we should live at peace with actuality. The peace which cognition establishes with the actual world has more warmth in it than this (Another version translated by T. M. Knox: “It is a warmer peace with the world which knowledge supplies.”).」(Ibid., p.23)
「When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.」(Ibid.)
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讀羅素的《西方哲學史》，見其對黑格爾甚多疵議，尤其是在對待戰爭的立場上。我想雙方態度興許也是可理解的：畢竟前者是寫作於二戰剛剛結束的時候，而後者乃是置身於歐洲協調（The Concert of Europe）的期間。（20/3/2022）
「War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external accident, which itself therefore has some accidental cause, be it injustices, the passions of nations or the holders of power, &c., or in short, something or other which ought not to be (H. B. Nisbet’s version: For war should not be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external contingency whose cause [Grund] is therefore itself contingent, whether this cause lies in the passions of rulers or nations, in injustices etc., or in anything else which is not as it should be)... War is the state of affairs which deals in earnest with the vanity(vain) of temporal goods and concerns (T. M. Knox’s version: War is the state of affairs in which the vanity of temporal goods and concerns is treated with all seriousness) - a vanity at other times a common theme of edifying sermonising (H. B. Nisbet’s version: which tends at other times to be merely a pious phrase). This is what makes it the moment in which the ideality of the particular attains its right and is actualised. War has the higher significance that by its agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, 'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in(means during, while; not because, owe to) their indifference to the stabilisation of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone “perpetual”, peace.'」(Philosophy of Right, trans by S. W. Dyde) From (https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate2.htm)
「The particular form of bad conscience which betrays itself in the vainglorious eloquence of this superficial philosophy may be remarked on here; for in the first place, it is precisely where it is at its most spiritless that it has most to say about spirit, where its talk is driest and most lifeless that it is freest with the words 'life' and 'enliven', and where it shows the utmost selfishness of empty arrogance that it most often refers to the 'people'.」(trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.16)
這番話，若將「superficial philosophy」一詞改換成「寫作」（或「言說」），其實亦同樣適用。（22/1/2022）
‧
大致看完《法哲學原理》的序言，也算是粗略印證了一些最初的「想當然」式的估計：黑格爾的理性（或Geist）實乃一種「浪漫化」（romanticized）了的「道」（畢竟其學說也是生成於浪漫主義的高峰時代）。（24/1/2022）
「It is a great obstinacy, the kind of obstinacy which does honour to human beings, that they are unwilling to acknowledge in their attitudes [Gesimlzmg] anything which has not been justified by thought - and this obstinacy is the characteristic property of the modem age, as well as being the distinctive principle of Protestantism.」(trans by H. B. Nisbet, p.22)
「Reason is not content with an approximation which, as something 'neither cold nor hot', it 'spews out of its mouth'; and it is as little content with that cold despair which confesses that, in this temporal world, things are bad or at best indifferent, but that nothing better can be expected here, so that for this reason alone we should live at peace with actuality. The peace which cognition establishes with the actual world has more warmth in it than this (Another version translated by T. M. Knox: “It is a warmer peace with the world which knowledge supplies.”).」(Ibid., p.23)
「When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.」(Ibid.)
‧
讀羅素的《西方哲學史》，見其對黑格爾甚多疵議，尤其是在對待戰爭的立場上。我想雙方態度興許也是可理解的：畢竟前者是寫作於二戰剛剛結束的時候，而後者乃是置身於歐洲協調（The Concert of Europe）的期間。（20/3/2022）
「War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external accident, which itself therefore has some accidental cause, be it injustices, the passions of nations or the holders of power, &c., or in short, something or other which ought not to be (H. B. Nisbet’s version: For war should not be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external contingency whose cause [Grund] is therefore itself contingent, whether this cause lies in the passions of rulers or nations, in injustices etc., or in anything else which is not as it should be)... War is the state of affairs which deals in earnest with the vanity(vain) of temporal goods and concerns (T. M. Knox’s version: War is the state of affairs in which the vanity of temporal goods and concerns is treated with all seriousness) - a vanity at other times a common theme of edifying sermonising (H. B. Nisbet’s version: which tends at other times to be merely a pious phrase). This is what makes it the moment in which the ideality of the particular attains its right and is actualised. War has the higher significance that by its agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, 'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in(means during, while; not because, owe to) their indifference to the stabilisation of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone “perpetual”, peace.'」(Philosophy of Right, trans by S. W. Dyde) From (https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate2.htm)
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