Unreal as a pathway to “emptiness” - A study of the mystification of Buddhism佛教玄學化 during Wei-jin and Seng-chao’s “The Emptiness of the Unreal”不真空論

Topic: Unreal as a pathway to “emptiness” - A study of the mystification of Buddhism佛教玄學化 during Wei-jin and Seng-chao’s “The Emptiness of the Unreal”不真空論

 

The blending of Buddhism with Xuanxue 玄學 during the Wei-jin 魏晉period is probably one of the most significant and thought-provoking phenomenon in the history of the Buddhists’ Sinicization. Unlike the earlier Han period, in which Buddhist practices were commonly seen by the Chinese as just another “type” of Huanglao teaching, Buddhism in Wei-jin had started to establish its own independent image in both elites’ and plebeians’ eyes, largely thanked to the fact that the non-Han regimes in northern China (e.g. Yao Xing姚興 of Later Qin) were generally more receptive and tolerant to foreign religions.[1] However, while Buddhism was able to benefit greatly from the era’s cultural clash and thus developing its ideology and character into certain discernible facets (or schools), the situation also raised discontent from some monks who had witnessed the twist and misapprehension of many original Buddhist concepts and ideas caused by the excessive influence of the Chinese Xuanxue. And the most conspicuous one would be the concept “emptiness”, of which was often fashionably simplified (or confused) as a kind of “existent/non-existent”有無 mystic talk玄談 between intellectuals. For the monks who objected to this phenomenon, most notably represented by Seng-chao僧肇(384-414), they deemed it as an undesirable ideological trend, as they believed that it had rigidified the Buddhist meaning of “empty”, and its over-affiliated and flattering attitude toward Xuanxue would eventually lead the Chinese Buddhists astray from the Buddha’s truth. The first part of my article would discuss the impact of Xuanxue on the Wei-jin Buddhism. Then, I would focus on the essay “The Emptiness of the Unreal” 不真空論, written by Seng-chao, and would suggest that this important exposition had left a lasting legacy in reasserting the centrality of “emptiness” in the Chinese Buddhist thought, as it had refreshed the concept from the Xuanxue’s banal interpretation of “nothingness” with the new reading of “unreal”. Most importantly, is that the exposition had signified a turn of the Chinese Buddhism from its initial detached and withdrawal attitude toward the society (which was clearly influenced by its early affiliation with the Daoist philosophy) to the subsequent worldly spirit入世精神 that we are now familiar of what Buddhism is, which is to emphasize on the practitioners’ engagement and experience from the real world. Its text had embodied characteristics of both epistemology and idealism, and its thought can even find echos in the teaching of the later Neo-Confucianism (e.g. Wang Yangming王陽明), which pretty much demonstrated the significance of Seng-chao’s rectification to the mystification of Buddhism 佛教玄學化 to the whole Chinese intellectual history.

 

The mystification of Buddhism

 

The Daoist impact to the early development of Chinese Buddhism is evident in scores of its classical texts. The only change of the former was perhaps that in the earlier days, the Huanglao was more about the methods of practice修行方法 for normal people to gain supernatural or superhuman ability神通 in their lives, while for the later Xuanxue, it stressed more on the dialectics and realization of the concept of “original non-Being”本無. The influence of the Daoist supernatural aspect was visible even in some Buddhist texts from the late Three Kingdom period, as in the preface of Ānāpānasati Sutta 安般守意經 authored by Kang Senghui康僧會, it wrote “得安般行者……無幽不睹……無遐不見，無聲不聞……制天地，住壽命；猛神德，壞天兵；動三千，移諸剎。八不思議，非梵所測，神德無限……”. Nonetheless, this trend of immortal teaching長生久視之術 was soon under challenge by not just the pragmatic intellectuals but also the rulers, as Cao Pi曹丕 had once remarked in his《典論》, “夫生之必死，成之必敗，天地所不能變，聖賢所不能免。然而惑者望乘風雲，與螭龍共駕，適不死之國……然死者相襲，丘壟相望，逝者莫反，潛者莫形，足以覺也”. Hence, after the decline of the old Daoist supernaturalism, there was the replacement by the Wei-jin Xuanxue, which was also habitually branded by the later scholars as a reflection of the nihilistic (or escapist) zeitgeist of that time. And one of the most notable feature of Xuanxue was their obsessive philosophical debate regarding the proposition of “non-existent”, or “original non-Being”本無. For example, in the Wang Yan’s biography of Book of Jin晉書王衍傳, it noted that “何晏、王弼立論，天地萬物皆以無為本”. In Wang Bi’s 王弼annotated version of Laozi, it wrote “人能反乎天理之本以無為用，則無窮而無不載矣”, and also in his annotation from I Ching, he elaborated the復hexagram as “復者，反本之謂也。天地以本為心者也。凡動息則靜，靜非對動者也；語息則默，默非對語者也”. We can see how concepts like “existent/non-existent”有無 and “root/tip” 本末 were stressed and employed repeatedly in the writings of the Xuanxue intellectuals. And in the last account as quoted above, although concepts like “moving/stationary” 動/靜, “speaking/silent” 語/默were not mean to be put in binary opposition, the preference (or priority) of the author was clear, as moving would always come from and be subjected to stationary, just as speaking to silent, and existent to non-existent. That was the rule of “nature” that the Xuanxue scholars thought that people should comply with and follow: a “return” to the origin of mankind, namely “nothingness”, and then tried to make use of it. This kind of wool-gathering ideological trend was so in vogue among intellectuals of the time, and a Jin philosopher Pei Wei 裴頠 had once write an essay In Veneration of Existence崇有論 to indicate the flaw of their thought,

 

悠悠之徒，駭乎若茲之釁，而尋艱爭所緣。察夫偏質有弊，而睹簡損之善，遂闡貴無之議，而建賤有之論。賤有則必外形，外形則必遺制，遺制則必忽防，忽防則必忘禮。禮制弗存，則無以為政矣。

 

Therefore he argues that no matter for the advocate of frugality or the exclusion of human desire, it should never be taken to an extreme (“夫盈欲可損而未可絕有也，過用可節而未可謂無貴也”). And the indulgence of scholars in the debate of existence/non-existence was also dangerous in his opinion, as “the objective feature of things can be examined, yet the abstract theories are always hard to verify (“形器之故有徵，空無之義難檢，辯巧之文可悅，似象之言足惑”). Nevertheless, the ideology of Xuanxue was so pervasive that almost all the Six Schools and Seven Models六家七宗 of Buddhism were more or less reshaped by it during that time. As Tang Yongtong湯用彤 remarks, “夫般若理趣，同符老莊，而名僧風格，酷肖清流，宜佛教玄風，大振於華夏也”, and the method of ko-yi 格義 (which is to analogize Buddhist idea to the Chinese traditional thought in order to make the former comprehensible) that was widely employed in early Jin also made Buddhism very susceptible to the Xuanxue’s influence.[2] And one of the most common habit of the Buddhists of that time was to use the Daoist concept “nothingness”無 to interpret the Buddhist idea “emptiness”空, as Tang Yongtong comments, even some of the most prestigious Buddhist masters like Dao'an釋道安 and Zhu Fashen竺法深 were not exempt from this phenomenon (“而東晉以來，佛教大師釋道安以及竺法深，染當時玄學之風，亦不免偏於虛無”).[3] For example, in the former’s《合放光光讚略解序》, it writes that “真際者，無所著也，泊然不動，湛爾玄齊……萬法有為而此法淵默，故曰無所有者是法之真也”. And for the School of “original non-Being” 本無宗, it even asserts that “如來興世，以本無弘教……本無之論，由來尚矣。何者？夫冥造之前，廓然而已。至於元氣陶化，則群象禀形。形雖資化，權化之本，則出於自然。自然自爾，豈有造之者哉？由此而言，無在元化之前，空為眾形之始，故為本無……夫人之所滯，滯在末有。宅心本無，則斯累豁矣。夫崇本可以息末者，蓋此之謂也”.[4] Readers can easily taste a rich Daoist “texture” from both its metaphor and rhetoric style. However, does this kind of “nothingness” interpretation really conform to the idea of “emptiness” from the original Buddhism? If we look back to the Indian scriptures, the traditional Buddhists are actually using a perspective of “every dharma have no inherent character”諸法無自性 to explain the “emptiness” of all appearances in the world.[5] A short hymn from the classical Buddhist text Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 中論, written by the Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna龍樹 (and translated by Kumārajīva鳩摩羅什), once concisely states that “if you see a dharma and think that it has an inherent character, you are actually seeing its existence as without causation” (“若汝見諸法，決定有性者，即為見諸法，無因亦無緣”). And logically, a dharma having no inherent character does not necessarily entail its inexistence. The characterlessness of dharma does not represent that they are stemmed from nothingness, and the old teaching of Buddhism also did not show such a strong desire of “returning to origin”返本 as Xuanxue did. As Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra 放光般若經 describes, “空亦無來亦無去。諸法所至，亦無有相，亦無有願”, “諸法亦不去，亦不來，無有住處”, and “菩薩摩訶薩從初發意以來，不見法有生滅，亦不見有增減，亦不見著、亦不見斷”. The adherence of “returning to origin” of the Xuanxue scholars is in fact clinging to a vain虛妄 conviction, which is definitely contrary to the Buddhist truth. The “emptiness” that early Buddhism emphasizes is about the nature of “impermanence” and “lack of solidity” that things possess.[6] As Lai Yonghai賴永海 insightfully points out, “魏晉時期的思想家多致力於萬物本體之體會……支讖、支謙稱真如曰『空』，與老莊、玄學的『道』、『無』一樣，均指本體……作為結果，般若學之『真諦』、『俗諦』思想，『緣起性空』理論，就變成一種『本末』、『有無』之談”.[7] And Ren Jiyu任繼愈 also expresses similar view and says that “佛教般若學在更多的場合是否認萬物之上、之後有一個永恆不變的本體高懸在那裏主宰着一切的”.[8] Therefore, we might then better understand why Kumārajīva had once lamented that “今在秦地，深識者寡。折翮於此，將何所論”, as well as the discontent that those erudite monks might feel due to the distortion that their religion had undergone in China.[9] 

 

Seng-chao’s “The Emptiness of the Unreal”

 

Seng-chao is one of the most well-known and influential disciple of Kumārajīva, and was once praised by his teacher as “the best person to interpret the idea ‘emptiness’” 解空第一.[10] He was known not only for his profound understanding of the Buddhist text but also his dexterity in the Chinese language, and that is why Yao Xing also ordered him to help his teacher to translate and finalize the scripture (“及什適長安。肇亦隨返。姚興命肇與僧睿等入逍遙園助詳定經論”, “肇便著波若無知論凡二千餘言。竟以呈什。什讀之稱善。乃謂肇曰。吾解不謝子。辭當相挹”).[11] His writing is characterized by a kind of sharp-wittedness, or using his own term, a skillfulness in employing the “expedient wisdom” 權智.[12] “The Emptiness of the Unreal” is one of his most celebrated essay, which includes some of his foundational rectification to over-mystification of Buddhism in the Six Schools and Seven Models. For example, with regard to the doctrine of the School of “original non-Being”, he argues that “本無者，情尚於無，多觸言以賓無。故非有，有即無；非無，無亦無。尋夫立文之本旨者，直以非有非真有，非無非直無耳。何必非有，無此有，非無，無彼無？此直好無之談，豈謂順通事實，即物之情哉？” The reasoning of his argument is particularly intriguing, as he does not really deny the existence (or truth) of yau有 and mo無, but what he rejects is the absoluteness that people like to employ when they assert about yau and mo (“何必非有，無此有，非無，無彼無”). In Tang Yongtong’s words, the main fault that most people committed during that time is that “從來說空，或偏尚虛空，以致分割有無，以遣有以存無，色敗乃有空”.[13] And as Paul Swanson suggests, Seng-chao has utilized a framework of “two truths” to discuss the meaning of “emptiness”, since in the latter’s view the yau and mo are actually compatible, and could ultimately be perceived as no different from each other.[14] The critical idea that he put forward and used to generalize the two truths in his essay, is the concept of “unreal”不真. As he expounds, “欲言其有，有非真生；欲言其無，事象既形。形象不即無，非真非實有。然則不真空義顯於茲矣”. Therefore, what Seng-chao proposed is not about whether he favors the yau side or mo side, but rather he is arguing for the Buddhist seemingly contradictory “not existent but also not inexistent”不有不無 doctrine that many people had failed to comprehend during that time. Regarding this abstruse conviction, Swanson has offered a rather incisive elucidation in his article,

 

“...‘nonexistence’非有 is affirmed in the sense that though phenomena have conventional existence, they have no substantive Being. ‘Not inexistent’非無 is affirmed in the sense that though phenomena have no substantive Being, they are not complete nothingness.” [15]

 

And to render this idea even more graspable, Seng-chao has made use of an analogy in his essay, that “故《放光》云，諸法假號不真。譬如幻化人，非無幻化人，幻化人非真人也”. The inference here is clear, that being “unreal” does not entail that it is equal to nothingness. Therefore, the most significant contribution of this essay to the development of Buddhism in China is that it has introduced the idea of “unreal” to interpret the Buddhist concept “emptiness”, which enables it to be distinguished from the Daoist idea of mo無, and thus forestalling the danger that Buddhism might get completely absorbed into the Xuanxue thought. And the most valuable legacy that it has left for the Chinese intellectual history, is its fair criticism to the nihilistic inclination of the Wei-jin Xuanxue as well as its latent nod to what we today called as epistemology, as demonstrated in the following quotations,

 

“尋夫不有不無者，豈謂滌除萬物，杜塞視聽，寂廖虛豁，然後為真諦者乎？”

“是以聖人乘千化而不變，履萬惑而常通者，以其即萬物之自虛，不假虛而虛物也。”

 

Therefore, instead of saying that he is arguing for a kind of absolute truth, it might be better to conclude that he is actually advocating for a type of “appropriate” attitude, which he called it as “即物之自虛”, or in Ren Jiyu’s interpretation, “一是承認物也是一種有，二是此物之有的性是虛”.[16] Yet in the closing of his essay, he also expresses a quite positive philosophical worldview,

 

“不動真際為諸法立處，非離真而立處，立處即真也。然則道遠乎哉？觸事而真。聖遠乎哉？體之即神！”

 

What he emphasizes here, is the essentiality and irreplaceableness of human experience. And what is even more inspiring, is that we can actually find echo of his thought from some of the well-known texts of the about a-thousand-year-later Neo-Confucian School of heart teaching,

 

“先生游南鎮，一友指巖中花樹問曰：「天下無心外之物：如此花樹，在深山中自開自落，於我心亦何相關？」先生曰：「你未看此花時，此花與汝心同歸於寂：你來看此花時，則此花顏色一時明白起來：便知此花不在你的心外。」” －王陽明《傳習錄》

 

From the above, we might then to an extent imagine what a lasting effect that Seng-chao’s thought could have had left on the Chinese intellectual history. While his essay is obviously aiming to redefine the uniqueness of “emptiness”, he is mindful enough to eschew any assertions that might render the Buddhist teaching rigid. As Swanson remarks, Seng-chao is opposed to both annihilationism and eternalism, which I would further categorize them as a kind of absolutism.[17] His reasoning might sometimes unavoidably involve process of equating one idea to another idea, yet what it truly emphasizes is the moment of epiphany, as well as the transcendent experience that it would (and might) bring along.

8 May 2021 

Footnotes

[1]  任繼愈，《中國佛教史（第二卷）》，中國社會科學出版社，1985，頁1，446。

[2] 湯用彤，《漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史》，商務印書館，2015，頁125，192。

[3] Ibid. P.268.

[4] 《名僧傳抄．曇濟傳》。

[5] 賴永海，《佛典輯要》，山東人民出版社，1992，頁4。

[6] 任繼愈，《中國佛教史（第二卷）》，中國社會科學出版社，1985，頁113。

[7] 賴永海，《佛典輯要》，山東人民出版社，1992，頁5-7。

[8] 任繼愈，《中國佛教史（第二卷）》，中國社會科學出版社，1985，頁122-123。

[9] 《高僧傳卷第二》。

[10]《名僧傳》。

[11] 《高僧傳．晉長安釋僧肇》。

[12] 僧肇《注維摩詰經》卷五〈問疾品〉：權智，此經之關要。《注維摩詰經》CBETA 電子版, p.96. From (http://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/BDLM/sutra/chi_pdf/sutra16/T38n1775.pdf)

[13] 湯用彤，《漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史》，商務印書館，2015，頁268。

[14] Swanson, Paul L., The Spirituality of Emptiness in Early Chinese Buddhism. Buddhist Spirituality I. World Spirituality: An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest, vol. 8, pp. 353–75, 1993, p.374. From (https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/en/files/2012/11/The-Spirituality-of-Emptiness-Encyclopedia-of-World-Spirituality.pdf)

[15] Ibid. P.375.

[16] 任繼愈，《中國佛教史（第二卷）》，中國社會科學出版社，1985，頁484。

[17] Swanson, Paul L., The Spirituality of Emptiness in Early Chinese Buddhism. Buddhist Spirituality I. World Spirituality: An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest, vol. 8, pp. 353–75, 1993, p.375. 

 

Bibliography

 

賴永海，《佛典輯要》，山東人民出版社，1992。

 

Swanson, Paul L., The Spirituality of Emptiness in Early Chinese Buddhism. Buddhist Spirituality I. World Spirituality: An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest, vol. 8, pp. 353–75, 1993. From (https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/en/files/2012/11/The-Spirituality-of-Emptiness-Encyclopedia-of-World-Spirituality.pdf)

 

任繼愈，《中國佛教史》，中國社會科學出版社，1985。

 

湯用彤，《漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史》，商務印書館，2015。